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USE OF THE SPECIAL WARRANTY IN 
OKLAHOMA AND TEXAS OIL AND GAS 
TRANSACTIONS 
JAMES R. STRAWN* 
I. Introduction. 
The overwhelming majority of oil and gas property conveyances contain 
granting words that appear to qualify the conveyance as a quitclaim.  Such 
granting words are usually something similar to “grants and conveys all 
right, title and interest of Grantor.” Though the words “grant and convey” 
imply certain title related covenants,1 the expression of the quantum of 
interest conveyed as “all right, title and interest” clarifies that the intent of 
the conveyance is to quitclaim, and courts commonly find them to be 
quitclaims2.  If there is no provision in the conveyance illustrating 
otherwise, the “all right, title and interest” conveyance will be deemed a 
quitclaim, and there will be no implied title related covenants.  However, 
these same conveyances almost always contain what is known as a special 
warranty.  The special warranty clause usually says something like 
“Grantor warrants [title] to the [property] against claims by, through and 
under Grantor, but not otherwise.”  Whether the inclusion of the special 
warranty morphs the conveyance into something more than a quitclaim is a 
                                                                                                                 
 * Jim Strawn is a member of Winstead's Energy Law Practice Group. His 35-year 
career has been focused on oil and gas matters with extensive experience in all facets of the 
exploration and production business, and the legal issues, agreements, claims, transactions 
and litigation associated therewith. 
 1. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16 §19 (2016). 
 2. The conveyance of “all, right, title and interest” is universally understood to 
accomplish a quitclaim. Hamman v. Keigwin, 39 Tex. 34, 35 (1873). 
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question I often confront.  The answer can be elusive and requires careful 
reading of the entire instrument, including any exhibits, to determine (a) 
what exactly is being conveyed, (b) whether there is an express or implied 
warranty that applies, and (c) what the scope of any such warranty is.  The 
purpose of this paper is to address these questions and suggest drafting 
considerations so that grantors and grantees can make sure they end up with 
a conveyance that meets their needs under the circumstances.  
The most common form of conveyance used is the general warranty 
deed.  The typical home buyer receives title under a general warranty deed.  
In Oklahoma it is defined as a deed that complies with Title 16 and as such 
implicitly conveys covenants of title.3  The covenants are the covenant of 
seisin, the covenant of right to convey, the covenant against encumbrances, 
the covenant of warranty and the covenant of quiet enjoyment.4  Unless it is 
limited by express words, such a deed conveys an estate in fee simple and 
of inheritance.5 
The primary reason that general warranty deeds are used in residential 
real estate transactions is that the typical seller has little or no bargaining 
power against buyers, realtors and mortgagees to avoid using anything less 
than a general warranty deed.  In commercial real estate transactions like oil 
and gas property sales, sellers have more bargaining power and it is more 
common to see them use quitclaim conveyances.   
A quitclaim transfers only the rights the grantor has in the described 
lands, without any warranty or representation that it owns anything at all, 
and is often characterized as such by the use in the granting clause of the 
words “all of grantor’s right, title and interest.”6  However, in the oil and 
gas industry, though it is a standard to use the quitclaim words “all right, 
title and interest,” the status of the conveyance as a quitclaim can be called 
into question by inclusion in the conveyance of a warranty against title 
related claims “by, through and under grantor, but not otherwise.”  The first 
clause is intended to craft the form as a quitclaim, and the second is 
commonly referred to as the “special warranty.”7   
As stated earlier, the two clauses are used together in almost all oil and 
gas property conveyances, to the point of being standard boilerplate.  Even 
so, once the special warranty is pasted in, the “all right, title and interest” 
quitclaim clause may not work as such. 
                                                                                                                 
 3. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16 §19 (2016). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. § 29. 
 6. Id. § 18. 
 7. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1725 (9th ed. 2009). 
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II. Origin of the Quitclaim in America. 
In order to better understand the nature of the quitclaim deed and the 
effect of using the two clauses in the same instrument, it helps to 
understand the history of the quitclaim deed. 
In the age of American westward expansion, the enormous demand for 
land transactions meant that deeds had to become simple and standard.  
They had to be standardized due to a lack of trained draftsmen, and mass-
produced to accommodate mass use.8 
Complications such as livery of seisin were of little or no use in America 
and abolished early on.9  Deeds needed to follow a simple, rational form so 
lawyers worked out two basic types of deed.  The warranty deed grew out 
of the old deed of bargain and sale, with covenants of warranty.  The 
quitclaim deed developed from the common-law release.10  The common 
law release was convenient to resolving title issues related to possible 
current or past events of ownership or possession by the grantor and was 
made to a current possessor.  In such case, the alleged possessor/grantor 
released claims to title without representation or warranty.   
A warranty deed was used to make a full transfer of land from one owner 
to another.  The seller guaranteed that it had and could transfer good title.  
The quitclaim deed made no such promises.  It simply transferred whatever 
rights the transferor had, good or bad, and was so understood.  Grantors 
used quitclaim deeds to transfer cloudy or contingent rights to land.  Deed 
forms were available in popular form books, and in various versions of 
Every Man His Own Lawyer, or books with similar titles, which sold 
thousands of copies in America.  Using these books, laymen could make 
deeds on their own.11 
III. Origin of Use of the Clauses in Oil and Gas Transactions. 
All experienced landmen, brokers and oil and gas attorneys are familiar 
with the clauses “grants all right title and interest” and “warrants by, 
through and under Grantor, but not otherwise.”  However, not all 
understand how these clauses became standard in every oil and gas property 
transaction. 
                                                                                                                 
 8. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW chapt. 5 (2nd edition 
1985). 
 9. The New York legislature expressly abolished the approaches. N.Y. REAL PROP § 
149 (1827) (current version at N.Y. Real Prop. § 241(1909)). 
 10. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, 223 (A. James Casner, ed., 1952). 
 11. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 237. 
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In my experience, the reasons the clauses have become standard differ 
depending on whether the transaction involves exploratory property versus 
productive property.   
As to exploration property in the United States, oil and gas rights are 
deemed of little value until there is a related discovery that is determined to 
be economically developable.  Until such a discovery, the oil and gas rights 
can usually be acquired or leased for little value, and held by the buyer or 
lessee for exploration or speculation.  In areas where exploration might be 
warranted, such rights or leaseholds are typically acquired by oil and gas 
land brokers who purchase acreage often in large blocks to sell to oil 
companies.  The broker and company may have an agreement under which 
the company funds the acquisitions, and/or pays a per acre fee.  In some 
cases, there may be seismic, or exploratory drilling being conducted in the 
area that could invite competition for acreage, so secrecy as to both the 
acquisition and who is buying are important to the parties.  At the time of 
the broker’s acquisition, due to the fact that the rights are typically of 
relatively low value, and the need to acquire them quickly before 
competition arrives, the broker conducts just enough title investigation to 
identify those who might have a claim to title.  Considering that the broker 
is usually paid by the acre, it is incentivized to acquire leases covering as 
much property from as many potential claimants as possible, as quickly as 
possible.  For these reasons, the broker is not in a position to make any 
representation or warranty to its buyer as to the quality or quantity of title, 
so a quitclaim conveyance is used to transfer the rights from the broker to 
the buyer.  The buyer understands this, and expects nothing more than a 
quitclaim from the broker.  The buyer is also not in a position to do much 
title due diligence until it decides to drill, a relatively expensive proposition 
that justifies the expense of thorough title examination.  On the other hand, 
when the buyer acquires from the broker, it expects some assurance that the 
broker has not encumbered the property, perhaps by conveying a cost free 
royalty or overriding royalty interest to a third party before the conveyance 
to the buyer is recorded.  For this reason, it is commonplace for the broker 
to provide in the conveyance that it will protect the buyer from title claims 
“by, through and under” the broker, but not otherwise (a special warranty). 
The above factors explain how quitclaims including a special warranty 
became standard in transactions involving speculative oil and gas rights, but 
they do not explain why such clauses are standard in sales of producing oil 
and gas properties.  The factors that led to standardized use in broker 
transactions do not apply to sales of producing properties.  Producing 
properties have been developed, often at considerable expense.  Before 
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drilling, prudent developers confirm that their property rights are valid by 
acquiring a comprehensive title opinion from a competent oil and gas title 
specialist.  Title issues identified in the opinion are then resolved using 
fill-in acquisitions and curative instruments.  Considering that title should 
have been thoroughly scrubbed by the time of the first sale of oil and gas, 
and that the secrecy and expedience factors in broker acquisitions do not 
apply to producing property acquisitions, it should be reasonable for buyers 
of producing properties to expect a full title warranty from their seller.  
Nevertheless, quitclaims including a special warranty are standard in 
producing property sales for several reasons. 
The producing property seller is usually selling because it is totally 
exiting ownership positions in the area, and wants assurance that it will not 
be subject to costly title claims of any kind after the sale.  Even though the 
seller or its predecessors may have scrubbed the title at some time, both the 
seller and the buyer know that because title issues can be challenging to 
identify and cure, previously unknown title issues could crop up during or 
after the sale.  Even known potential title issues may have been ignored by 
the seller or its predecessors as inconsequential or left as “skeletons in the 
closet” never to be opened.  Both parties also understand that a title claim 
covering producing properties could impact not only the value of producing 
wells, but the value of future development opportunities.  The cost of curing 
bad title and paying true owners could be significant and even exceed the 
sale price.  Recouping revenue from overpaid non-owners is often 
impossible after a sale, especially recoupment by a seller that has exited the 
area.  The seller may be planning to invest the sale proceeds on other 
projects and expects the sale price to remain firm after closing, so it does 
not expect to be subject to title claims the buyer might uncover, or let out of 
the closet after the sale.  For these reasons, producing property sellers prefer 
the quitclaim. 
The buyer understands that an oil and gas property seller is not going to 
provide a full warranty, so the buyer accepts a quitclaim.  Even if it could 
get a full title warranty, it may not be prudent for the buyer to rely on 
assurances of title from the seller, who may not be able to honor them; the 
seller may have sold all its assets, or otherwise may not be in a financial 
position to honor the warranty.  
Due to the fact that sellers are unwilling to warrant title, and that prudent 
buyers realize that they should not rely on warranties if given, standard 
purchase agreements provide that the seller will allow and facilitate the 
buyer’s evaluation of title before closing.  The typical agreement provides 
that title defects discovered by the buyer shall either be cured before 
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closing, or the purchase price will be adjusted downward at closing by the 
value of the defective interest.  Considering that the buyer will have 
evaluated title before closing, it would be understandable for a buyer to 
accept a quitclaim without a special warranty.  Nevertheless, buyers 
typically ask for a special warranty, and sellers usually provide them.  The 
buyer’s reason for asking for a special warranty is that it expects assurance 
from the seller, as the party that owns and controls the property, that it has 
not encumbered the property during its watch.  This is not asking much of 
the seller, who is presumed to know what it has or has not done to 
encumber the property.  
IV. Impact of Inclusion of a Special Warranty in a “Right, Title and 
Interest” Conveyance. 
Considering that the grantor prefers using a quitclaim because it offers 
no warranty of title, the question of whether the inclusion of a special 
warranty implies something more or changes the instrument’s status as a 
quitclaim needs to be answered.  In addressing this question, it is 
convenient to view the quitclaim as a conveyance that represents and 
warrants no quantum of interest other than zero.  Essentially, the grantor is 
representing that it owns nothing, and by adding the special warranty, it is 
guaranteeing title to it (nothing) against those claiming by, through or under 
grantor.  Nevertheless, even though a reasonable person might think that a 
clause limiting a “warranty to nothing” to claims brought only by a certain 
class of claimants (those making claims, by through or under grantor) 
should be considered meaningless surplusage, courts have, as you might 
guess, pressed to attribute some degree of usefulness to the special warranty 
in “all right, title and interest” conveyances. 
The other possible effect to consider is whether the special warranty 
resurrects implied warranties that apply in non-quitclaim conveyances.   
Following is an analysis of relevant laws and cases under Oklahoma and 
Texas law dealing with the use of both clauses in the same instrument.   
A. Texas 
1. Implied Title Warranties in Texas 
The Texas Property Code specifies that unless a conveyance expressly 
provides otherwise, the use of the terms “grant” or “convey” in a 
conveyance of an estate of inheritance or fee simple implies grantor 
covenants that (1) prior to the execution of the conveyance the grantor has 
not conveyed the estate or any interest in the estate to a person other than 
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the grantee and (2) at the time of the conveyance the estate is free from 
encumbrances.12  “An implied covenant under this section may be the basis 
for a lawsuit as if it had been expressed in the conveyance.”13 
“The [statutory] covenant against encumbrances is distinct from the 
warranty of title and protects the grantee against interests in third persons 
which, though consistent with the fee being in the grantor, will diminish the 
value of the estate conveyed.”14  This statute only applies to conveyances 
by which an estate of inheritance or the fee simple is granted.  Therefore, 
the covenants specified will not be implied from the use of the word “grant” 
or “convey” in a quitclaim deed.15  Likewise, the provision has no 
application to deeds that do not purport to pass any estate of inheritance but 
merely the respective grantors’ right, title, and interest.16   
The following sections explore the case law in Texas to explain when, a 
grantor granting only its “right, title and interest” may be held liable for 
breach of a special warranty of title, when that grantor does not actually 
own an interest in the assigned property, and concludes that in Texas, 
whether the inclusion of a special warranty in an “all right, title and 
interest” conveyance creates something more than quitclaim is determined 
by the level of specificity in the definition of the conveyed interest. 
2. The Special Warranty in Texas 
Under Texas law, a warranty deed expressly binds the grantor to defend 
against title defects created by grantor and all prior titleholders.17  A special 
warranty deed limits the warranty of title so that the grantor will warrant to 
defend title against encumbrances or clouds on the title created by the 
grantor during its ownership or possession of the property.18  A grantee 
relying on a special warranty remains vulnerable to claims by anyone 
making a claim to the interest by, through, and under owners prior to the 
grantor in the chain of title or by a stranger in title.19   
In Texas, a covenant of title in a conveyance may either be express or 
implied from the use of the words “grant” or “convey” in the assigning 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 5.023(a) (West 1984). 
 13. Id. § 5.023(b). 
 14. Natland Corp. v. Baker’s Port, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 52, 61 (Tex. App. 1993, writ 
denied). 
 15. Baldwin v. Drew, 180 S.W. 614, 618 (Tex. App. 1915, no writ).   
 16. Renfrow v. Lineberry, 271 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 17. WILLIAM V. DORSANEO III ET AL., TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE, §254.02 (1994). 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. 
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document.20  However, a grantor may expressly limit a covenant of title by 
stipulating in the conveyance that the grantor is only bound to defend title 
against persons claiming “by, through, or under” the grantor.21  Such an 
express limitation of the covenant of title prevents a grantor from breaching 
its warranty of title, unless the adverse claim of title is asserted by someone 
“by, through, or under” the grantor.22  “A warranty clause in a conveyance, 
either general or limited, is no[t] part of the conveyance proper; it neither 
strengthens, enlarges, nor limits the title conveyed, but is a separate contract 
on the part of the grantor to pay damages in the event of failure of title.”23 
So, it follows that the quantum of interest conveyed in an “all right, title 
and interest” conveyance should not be affected by inclusion of the special 
warranty clause; it would be deemed a quitclaim.  However, Texas courts 
would not necessarily agree where the deed describes the property with 
more detail. 
3. Warranty Deed vs. Quitclaim Deed 
In Texas, Courts interpret the language in the entire instrument to 
determine whether it provides a warranty of title, or if it is merely a 
quitclaim of whatever interest a grantor may own.  For example, the words 
“I hereby grant lot 1” would indicate a deed of property, and the words “I 
hereby grant all of my right, title and interest in lot 1” would indicate a 
quitclaim.  A warranty deed conveys property, while a quitclaim deed 
conveys the grantor’s rights in that property, if any.24  When making the 
determination whether an instrument is a quitclaim or warranty deed, courts 
look to the parties’ intent as it appears from the language of the instrument 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See Fannin Invest. & Dev. Co. v. Neuhaus, 427 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968, no 
writ).   
 21. Id. at 88; also Whitehead v. State, 724 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex. App. 1987, writ 
ref’d); James v. Adams, 64 Tex. 193 (Tex. 1885) (explaining that a limitation of warranty of 
title that is clearly expressed in the deed will displace the implied covenant and restrict the 
remedy to the covenant expressed in the deed).   
 22. Garrett v. Houston Land & Trust Co., 33 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Tex. App. 1930, writ 
ref’d, n.r.e.); Sour Lake Co. v. Jackson, 130 S.W. 662, 663 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, no writ) 
(no warranty of title if the outstanding title was not acquired “through or under” the grantor, 
but rather, adversely to the grantor’s title).   
 23. Bond v. Bumpass, 100 S.W.2d 1047, 1049 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936), (citing 
Richardson v. Levi, 3 S.W. 444, 447 (Tex. 1887)).   
 24. Enerlex, Inc. v. Amerada Hess, Inc., 302 S.W.3d 351, 354 (Tex. App. 2009, no 
pet.); Geodyne Energy Income Production v. The Newton Corporation, 161 S.W.3d 482, 486 
(Tex. 2005) (explaining that a quitclaim deed conveys a grantor’s complete interest or claim 
in certain real property without warranting or professing that the title is valid).   
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itself.25  Courts look to whether the language of the instrument, taken as a 
whole, conveyed the property itself (a warranty deed or special warranty 
deed) or merely the grantor’s rights (a quitclaim deed).26  The controlling 
factor is not whether the grantor actually owned the title to the conveyed 
land, but whether the deed purported to convey the property.27  Therefore, a 
conveyance appearing to provide a warranty of title could be interpreted as 
a quitclaim of the grantor’s rights as opposed to a conveyance of property. 
In Enerlex, the grantor used a “Mineral Deed” to convey “[a]ll right, title 
and interest” in property, with the intent to “convey all interest in the said 
county” whether or not the provided legal description contained the 
interest.28  The conveyance also contained a general warranty of title.29  
Even though the deed contained an express general warranty, the court 
reasoned it was significant that the grantor did not represent she actually 
owned any mineral interest by the fact that she made no attempt to quantify 
that interest; therefore the warranty language did not bar the deed from 
being considered a quitclaim deed.30  The court held that the language of 
the deed, when viewed in its entirety, did not purport to convey a specific 
interest, but broadly conveyed all the grantor’s interest whatever it might 
be, effectively construing it to be a quitclaim deed.31  On the other hand, if 
the property is described in more detail, then courts could interpret it as a 
property conveyance, not a quitclaim.32  If the conveyance were to be 
interpreted as a quitclaim and the grantor did not own any interest in the 
property, the grantor would not be in breach of the special warranty. 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Enerlex, supra note 24, at 354 (citing Winningham v. Dyo, 48 S.W.2d 600, 603 
(Tex. 1932).   
 26. Geodyne, supra note 24, 486 (explaining that the assignment never stated the nature 
or percentage of the interest that was being conveyed, and was therefore a quitclaim deed); 
see also Porter v. Wilson, 389 S.W.2d 650, 654 (Tex. 1965), Threadgill v. Bickerstaff, 29 
S.W. 757 (Tex. 1895).   
 27. Enerlex, supra note 24, at 355.   
 28. Id. at 354.   
 29. Id.   
 30. Id. at 355 (citing Clark v. Gauntt, 161 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1942)).   
 31. Id.   
 32. See generally id.  Contra Whitehead, supra note 21, at 113 (holding that a 
conveyance with a special warranty containing the words “by, through, or under me, but not 
otherwise” granting specifically described property was a special warranty deed and not a 
quitclaim deed because it did not contain the words “quitclaim” nor “remise, release, and 
forever quitclaim…”); but see Cook v. Smith, 174 S.W. 1094 (Tex. 1915) (holding that the 
mere use of the term “quitclaim” is not of itself, a conclusive test of its character).   
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Courts have looked not only to the granting clause and property 
description to discern its character as a warranty deed or quitclaim deed, but 
also considered language in the habendum clause.33   
Texas courts have analyzed the distinction between a conveyance of 
property and a conveyance of whatever rights a grantor has to property (a 
quitclaim) when determining whether to honor special warranty language in 
a conveyance.34  In cases wherein courts have construed an instrument 
employing the words “all my right, title and interest” as one purporting to 
convey the land itself, they have found some wording in the instrument 
which evidenced an intention to convey the land itself rather than the right, 
title and interest of the grantor.35  One court has held that the words “it is 
my intention to convey … the real estate” as demonstrating the intent to 
convey land even though the instrument states that it is a quitclaim of all 
right, title and interest.36   
In Chesapeake, lessors leased land to Chesapeake for oil and gas 
exploration, including a special warranty of title in the lease.37  Chesapeake 
later discovered that the lessors did not own the leased property.38  The 
court held, by interpreting the lease as a whole, that granting the oil and gas 
lease with a special warranty of title was a conveyance of a determinable 
fee interest in the land, and could not be construed as a quitclaim of the 
lessors’ right to the property, whatever those rights might be.39  Therefore, 
Chesapeake was not barred from a claim of breach of the covenant of 
seisin, where the lessors did not own the leased property.40  However, the 
court did not address the fact that the lessors granted a special warranty to 
defend title “by, through and under” them, which would have barred the 
claim for breach of warranty of title.41   
                                                                                                                 
 33. Garrett v. Christopher, 12 S.W.67 (Tex. 1889) (use of the word “premises” in the 
habendum clause of a deed otherwise a quitclaim will enlarge its effect into that of a deed). 
 34. See generally Enerlex, supra note 23, at 354; Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. 
Dallas Parkinsonism Soc’y, Inc., No. 07-10-0397-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 6813 (Tex. 
App. Aug. 24, 2011, no pet.).   
 35. Porter, supra note 26, at 655.   
 36. See generally Cook v. Smith, 174 S.W. 1094 (Tex. 1915). 
 37. Chesapeake, supra note 34, at *5.   
 38. Id. at *6.   
 39. Id. at *13 (citing Parker v. Standard Oil Co. of Kansas, 250 S.W.2d 671, 681 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1952, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Whitehead, supra note 21, at 111; Van Cleave v. Bell Oil 
& Gas Co., 102 S.W.2d 1103, 1105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937, writ dism’d w.o.j.); Huling v. 
Moore, 194 S.W. 188, 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917, writ ref’d)).   
 40. Chesapeake, supra note 34, at *14.   
 41. See generally id. (Reversing and remanding to the trial court.).   
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4. Analysis and Conclusions - Texas 
It appears that a court in Texas should hold that a conveyance of “all 
right, title and interest” in property with a special warranty and no specific 
description of the interest conveyed in such property is a quitclaim of 
whatever interest the grantor has in that property, without any warranty that 
the grantor actually owns an interest in that property.42  Presumably, the 
grantor would not be liable for a breach of the special warranty if it did not 
own any interest at the time of the conveyance even if it previously 
conveyed that interest to a different party.  Since the definition of the 
interest or rights would be so unspecific and broad, the court would treat it 
as a quitclaim of whatever interest, if any, that the grantor owned at the 
time of the conveyance. 
If the “all right, title and interest” conveyance contains a more specific 
property or interest description, it could be constituted as more than a 
quitclaim.  The limiting special warranty language would protect the 
grantor as long as the interest was claimed through a prior owner in the 
chain of title, and so long as the grantor never stipulated that it owned 
perfect title at the time of the conveyance.43  However, if the grantor made 
a previous conveyance of part of its interest in sufficiently described 
property to one party, and under the subject deed it is conveying the 
remaining interest to a second party in a conveyance including a specific 
description of a larger interest in the property than the grantor owns at the 
time of the second conveyance, the specific description of the interest could 
lead a court to believe the parties intended the conveyance to convey 
property, and therefore the special warranty to defend title “by, through, 
and under” the grantor would be applicable to those described interests; the 
grantor previously conveyed a portion of the described interest to a 
different party, so the grantee of the second conveyance could have a claim 
for breach the special warranty of title. 
It appears that courts in Texas will interpret the conveyance of “all right, 
title and interest” based on the level of specificity of the description of the 
conveyed interest in the conveyance or the PSA (if effectively referenced in 
the conveyance).  The broader and less specific the definition of the 
interest, the more likely the court will construe it to be a mere quitclaim of 
the grantor’s right, if any, to the property, rendering any special warranty 
language useless to the grantee.  A more narrow and specific definition of 
the conveyed interest would allow the court to honor the special warranty 
                                                                                                                 
 42. See generally Enerlex, supra note 24, at 351. 
 43. McIntyre v. De Long, 8 S.W. 622, 623 (1888).   
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language and interpret it as a conveyance of that specific interest in 
property. 
B. Oklahoma 
1. Implied Title Warranties and Deed Construction in Oklahoma 
Under Oklahoma law, a deed that substantially complies with the 
statutory requirements implicitly conveys covenants of title.44  The 
covenants are the covenant of seisin, the covenant of right to convey, the 
covenant against encumbrances, the covenant of warranty and the covenant 
of quiet enjoyment.45  Further, unless limited by express words, a general 
warranty deed will convey an estate in fee simple and of inheritance.46 
Oklahoma courts have previously noted that the granting clause is the 
most essential element of the deed.47  The granting clause contains the 
words of transfer, and without it, the deed is ineffective to convey real 
property.  Additionally, the habendum clause is not absolutely necessary to 
make a deed effective.48  The habendum clause merely defines the extent of 
ownership in the thing granted to be held and enjoyed by the grantee.  In 
Oklahoma, if the granting clause and the habendum clause are so 
incompatible as to be irreconcilable, the granting clause will control and the 
habendum clause will be rejected as void.49  This rule only applies when the 
habendum clause attempts to enlarge the estate described in the granting 
clause.  Accordingly, a reservation may be inserted into a deed following 
the granting clause to diminish the interest or estate first described.50 
Placing this importance on the language contained in the granting clause 
is consistent with the language used in the statutory form of the general 
warranty deed in which the habendum clause contains narrower covenants 
than implied under the statute.51  In the granting clause of this form, 
grantors “grant, bargain, sell and convey” the real property to the grantee, 
“and warrant the title to the same,” but the habendum clause provided in the 
                                                                                                                 
 44. OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 16 §19 (2016). 
 45. Id.   
 46. Id. § 29. 
 47. Reed v. Whitney, 169 P.2d 187 (Okla. 1945).   
 48. Id.   
 49. Id.   
 50. See Colonial Royalties Co. v. Keener, 266 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1954) (“Where the 
intention of the parties is clearly expressed by an explanatory clause incorporated in the 
habendum clause, or in a separate clause, the latter may control over the granting clause of 
the deed.”). 
 51. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16 §40 (2016).   
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statutory warranty deed only reflects a covenant against encumbrances.52  
As mentioned earlier, in Oklahoma a deed in substantial compliance with 
the minimal language provided by the statutory form of a warranty deed 
contains the usual covenants of title. 
2. Background 
There is little Oklahoma case law discussing special warranties, but from 
the limited authority, it appears that like those in Texas, Oklahoma courts 
will look at the intent of the parties from the language in the entire deed to 
determine whether is it is a conveyance of property, or a quitclaim. 
3. Discussion 
As with Texas, in Oklahoma, a special warranty is one that limits the 
covenants offered therein to particular persons or claims.53  Typically, a 
special warranty deed contains all of the covenants of title which a general 
warranty deed contains, but limits the grantor’s liability to only those 
problems arising as a result of the grantor’s ownership.54  In Oklahoma 
cases, the language that qualifies a special warranty as such does not appear 
to be defined.  However, cases show that it typically contains all of the 
covenants of title that a general warranty contains, but the clause which 
states “and warrants title to the same” is replaced with “and warrants the 
title to the same, against any challenge claiming by, through or under, the 
grantor, but not otherwise,” or similar language.  Under a special warranty 
deed, the grantor will not be liable for any defects in title which occurred 
prior to the grantor’s ownership of title.55   
In contrast, the quitclaim deed conveys whatever right, title, and interest 
the grantor may have in the real property stated therein at the time of the 
conveyance.56  The grantor under a quitclaim deed does not offer any of the 
covenants of title associated with a general warranty deed.  The quitclaim 
deed does not transfer the real property itself to the grantee, but merely the 
grantor’s “right, title, and interest” in and to such real property.57  Because 
of this, quitclaims generally include a broad, non-specific property 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Id. (The habendum clause in the statutory form of warranty deed states that the real 
property is to be held “free, clear and discharged of and from all former grants, charges, 
taxes, judgments, mortgages and other liens and encumbrances of whatsoever nature.”). 
 53. Whayne v. McBirney, 157 P.2d 161 (Okla. 1945).   
 54. Id.   
 55. Id. 
 56. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa v. Price, 228 P.2d 623 (Okla. 1951).   
 57. Schuman v. McLain, 61 P.2d 226, 227–28 (Okla. 1936).   
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description and if the grantor does not own an estate in the real property, 
none is conveyed.  Essentially, the use of a quitclaim deed can be regarded 
as notice to the grantee that there may be outstanding equities against the 
grantor’s title.58  If a grantor who executes a quitclaim deed intends to 
reserve or retain any interest in realty, such reservation should be expressly 
stated in the deed.59 
Oklahoma courts generally hold that the intention of the parties as 
expressed in a deed is determined from the entire instrument and, where the 
intention is clearly expressed by an explanatory clause, the latter may 
control over the granting clause of the deed.60  Whether a deed is 
ambiguous is a question of law, and the test for ambiguity is whether the 
language is “susceptible to two interpretations on its face . . . from the 
standpoint of a reasonably prudent lay man, not from that of a lawyer.”61  
Where a written instrument is not ambiguous, the courts will determine the 
intent of the parties without resorting to extrinsic evidence; however, when 
ambiguity arises the intentions of the parties may be ascertained by 
circumstances surrounding the language.62   
Though there may be a lack of case law in Oklahoma dealing with 
special warranties in quitclaim deeds, there are cases involving deed 
construction that shed some light on how Oklahoma courts might deal with 
such instruments. 
One particular case illustrates the straightforward application of a 
quitclaim deed.  In Rox Petroleum, the grantor conveyed a 1/3 mineral 
interest for a term of ten years and so long after as oil and gas is produced.63  
In subsequent quitclaim deeds, the grantor conveyed the property “except 
all oil, gas and other minerals, all that portion of such mineral now owned 
by the grantors being reserved by them.”  These deeds also contained a 
description of the property referred to.  When the plaintiff sought to quiet 
title in the minerals arguing that the quitclaim deed excepted the possibility 
of reverter, the court held that the grantors clearly expressed their intent to 
reserve from the grant all their interest in the conveyed minerals, and that 
                                                                                                                 
 58. See id.   
 59. Anchor Stone & Material Co. v. Pollok, 344 P.2d 559, 561(Okla. 1959). 
 60. See Price, supra note 56, at 623; see also Messner v. Moorehead, 787 P.2d 1270, 
1271 (Okla. 1990).   
 61. American Economy Ins. Co. v. Bogdahn, 89 P.3d 1051, 1054 (Okla. 2004) (quoting 
Cranfill v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 49 P.3d 703, 706 (Okla. 2002).   
 62. Bryan v. Everett, 365 P.2d 146 (Okla. 1961). 
 63. Rox Petroleum, L.L.C. v. New Dominion, L.L.C., 184 P.3d 502 (Okla. 2008).   
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this reservation included the possibility of reverter previously reserved.64  
This case shows that even though a quitclaim purports to convey all right, 
title, and interest, a reservation in a quitclaim deed will be upheld by the 
court. 
Another such case is Young v. Vermillion, where grantor Fields conveyed 
property to Young via quitclaim deed, reserving an undivided one-half 
interest in the oil and gas and other minerals underlying a certain tract of 
land.65  At the time of the conveyance, Fields had already conveyed 7/8th of 
the minerals to a third party, leaving Fields with only a 1/8th interest.  
Several years later, Fields conveyed an undivided 1/8th interest to 
Wheeler.66  Young brought suit claiming ownership of the minerals, 
asserting that by the time Fields conveyed to Wheeler, he had already 
divested himself of all his ownership in the property because the quitcliam 
language covered everything Fields owned, and in order to reserve minerals 
one must expressly limit the granting language.  The court first pointed out 
that the quitclaim to Young did not purport to convey a mineral interest and 
since a quitclaim deed conveys only the interest the grantor holds in the 
property described in the deed, the language of the reservations would be 
surplusage if it were not intended to retain one-half of the minerals.67  The 
court then held that Fields had no duty to notify Young of any interest he 
did not own, and that the reservation had the effect of reserving one-half of 
the mineral interest in Fields regardless of the amount he actually owned at 
the time of the conveyance.68   
Another Oklahoma case illustrates what happens when a deed contains 
quitclaim as well as warranty language.  In Price, the grantor, Price, 
conveyed a 1/4 interest in the oil, gas, and minerals on the land through a 
deed that specifically stated “quitclaim, bargain, sell, convey, and set 
over.”69  Additionally, the deed described the land to be conveyed and 
included a clause stating that the intent was to convey the lands acquired by 
the grantor’s husband in a conveyance on September 15, 1938.70  It was 
later discovered that Price’s husband had conveyed an undivided 1/8 and 
6/200 to other persons before Price’s conveyance and the husband’s brother 
had conveyed another 1/4 interest to Price after Price’s conveyance.  Upon 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Id.   
 65. 992 P.2d 917, 919 (Okla. 1999).   
 66. Id.   
 67. Id.   
 68. Id. 
 69. Price, supra note 56, at 625.   
 70. Id.   
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learning this, the grantee’s claimed that they were entitled to the full 1/4 
mineral interest as was in the deed and that the 1/4 interest conveyed to 
Price by her brother in law vested in them under the provisions of the 
original deed.71  The court determined that (1) only the interest the grantor 
owned at the time of the deed was conveyed and did not include the 1/4 
later conveyed to Price and (2) the fact that Price thought she was conveyed 
a full 1/4 interest was immaterial by virtue of the quitclaim deed.72  Even 
though the deed contained warranty language, the court determined that the 
word “quitclaim,” along with the specificity in describing the land and the 
purpose of the deed clearly showed the intention of the parties. 
In Blythe v. Hines, the grantor used a special warranty deed to “grant, 
bargain, sell and convey,” “all her right, title and interest,” “in and to the 
surface estate.”73  The plaintiffs brought an action to quiet title to the sand, 
gravel, limestone, and rock in, upon and underlying the questioned 
property.  The court held that the grant of the “surface estate” with no 
reservations of minerals was ambiguous.  However, the court notably did 
not address whether the phrase “all her right, title and interest” was 
indicative of a possible quitclaim deed, or how this affected the special 
warranty. Instead, the case was reversed and remanded to determine what 
the parties intended “surface” to actually mean.74 
In St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Humphrey, the court took a 
different approach in construing the deed at issue.  In this case, the deed 
said that the grantor “bargain[ed], s[old] and convey[ed],” “for the right of 
way of,” a railroad company, “the following real property,” followed by a 
description of the property.75  The issue was whether the deed conveyed a 
right-of-way only, or an estate in fee simple in the strip of land involved.  
The court looked to controlling case law and applied a grammatical test to 
the pertinent language to find that “the direct object of the verbs of 
conveyance is not ‘the right of way,’” but was the strip of land described.76  
Additionally, the court noted that “every estate in land which shall be 
granted, conveyed or demised . . . shall be deemed an estate in fee simple . . 
. unless limited by express words.”  Finding no such words of limitation, 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id.   
 72. See id.   
 73. 577 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Okla. 1977).   
 74. Id.   
 75. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Humphrey, 446 P.2d 271, 272 (Okla. 1968).   
 76. Id. at 276.   
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and following controlling case law, the court held the estate conveyed was 
in fee simple.77   
Further, the Oklahoma courts require that the description of the premises 
conveyed be so certain and definite as to enable the land to be identified.  In 
Plano Petroleum, LLC v. GHK Exploration, L.P., Eldrige and Weems 
assigned “all right, title and interest in and to that certain wellbore, all 
leasehold” to Clydesdale Energy.78  About six years later, Clydesdale 
assigned its interest to Plano using the same language but adding a legal 
description of the lease.  Two months later, the original grantors, Eldrige 
and Weems, assigned “all of Assignor’s rights, titles, and interest” to 
GHK.79  This assignment included a description of the lease, but excepted 
from the lease “those rights thereunder pertaining to the well bore.”  The 
court held that the term “all leasehold” with no accompanying legal 
description of the leased premises was ambiguous and required extrinsic 
evidence.  The court held that the requirement of a legal description “is 
more than a legal nicety, it is essential for recording in the county clerk’s 
office and for establishing a chain of title,” and that “a deed that does not 
sufficiently describe the property interest conveyed is void on its face.”80  
However, the court notably did not address the issue surrounding the 
quitclaim language used in the deed.  The case was reversed and remanded 
to determine what the term “all leasehold” was intended to mean.81   
In Boswell Energy Corp. v. Arrowhead Homes, the McCalebs conveyed 
two parcels to Arrowhead via warranty deeds, which had “less and except 
all mineral interest” typed after the warranty language.82  The McCalebs 
subsequently leased the minerals, which were later assigned to Boswell.  
Arrowhead also conveyed their interest away, which subsequently was 
acquired by Petrocorp.83  Both Petrocorp and Boswell claimed ownership of 
the minerals.  Boswell claimed the deeds unambiguously reserved the 
minerals to the McCalebs, while Petrocorp argued that the placement of the 
exception in the warranty clause rather than the granting clause served to 
except the minerals from the covenant of warranty.84  Finding that the deeds 
were subject to two possible interpretations, the case was initially remanded 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Id. 
 78. 250 P.3d 328, 329 (Okla. 2011).   
 79. Id.   
 80. Id. at 331-32.   
 81. Id. 
 82. 99 P.3d 1229, 1230 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004).   
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.   
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to resolve the ambiguity.  On remand, the trial court found that the 
McCalebs reserved the minerals themselves, quieting title to the minerals in 
the McCalebs and the leasehold in Boswell.85  The Court of Civil Appeals 
affirmed, noting that the controlling factor was the intent of the parties, not 
the location of the exception.86   
4. Analysis and Conclusions – Oklahoma 
How Oklahoma courts construe deeds seems to turn on the specificity 
included in the conveying instrument.  Regardless of the words used, the 
courts will nevertheless look to the intent of the parties.  Where an 
instrument conveys “all right, title and interest,” with no special warranty 
language the courts will hold that the grantor quitclaimed the entire 
described interest with the exception of any reservations included in the 
deed.   
When a conveyance contains words of special warranty but also 
purporting to convey “all right, title and interest,” things become less clear.  
In Price, the court held the quitclaim deed with warranty language was 
nevertheless a quitclaim deed due to the specific property description and 
the intent clause at the bottom of the deed that clarified the intent to convey 
all interest acquired from another deed.  However, in Blythe, the deed was 
specifically a special warranty deed with quitclaim language, but the court 
failed to even address this issue, instead holding that the description of the 
land was ambiguous.  A lack of case law concerning special warranties 
makes it difficult to predict which way the Oklahoma courts would rule on 
this issue. 
In the case of warranty deeds, the courts require more specificity and 
look to words of limitation to decide what exactly was conveyed.  For 
example in St. Louis, the lack of any words of limitation led the court to 
find that the land was conveyed in fee-simple, even though the deed said 
the land was only to be used for a right of way.  Additionally, in Boswell 
the deed expressly contained reservations of mineral interests.  The court 
held that these reservations were unambiguous despite the fact that they 
were placed in the warranty clause rather than the granting clause, and 
found that the deed reserved the minerals in the grantor, rather than 
excepted them from the warranty. 
It appears that Oklahoma courts will interpret the conveyance of “all 
right, title and interest” based on how specific the instrument is concerning 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Id. at 1233.   
 86. Id. 
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the conveyed interest.  While there is a lack of case law on special 
warranties, ideally such a warranty would contain a legal description as 
well as a description of the particular interest being conveyed.  Similarly, 
the courts require warranty deeds to state the interest conveyed, as well as 
any limitations, reservations, or exceptions in order for them to be 
enforceable. In contrast, all that is required of quitclaim deeds is the terms 
“quitclaim,” or “all right, title and interest.”  It follows that an Oklahoma 
court would use these same measures where a conveyance with a special 
warranty contains quitclaim language.  If the instrument contains language 
that does not specify the type of interest being conveyed, they will likely 
construe it as a mere quitclaim of interests.  On the other hand, if there are 
words describing the specific interest being conveyed, the courts will likely 
deem the instrument a special warranty deed. 
V. Avoiding Unwanted Results by Careful Drafting. 
A. Carefully Defining What Property is Conveyed and Reserved. 
The granting clause description of the interest (in the case of a quitclaim) 
in property conveyed should be clear and consistent with the description in 
the property exhibit.  The grantee should also want the description of the 
property in the warranty clause to match the description in the granting 
clause and exhibit.  The grantor should make sure that anything not being 
conveyed is expressly reserved.  For example, if the granting clause and 
warranty clause refer to “leases described on Exhibit A,” and there is a 
column in this exhibit that specifies depth limitations, the assignor needs to 
clarify in the body of the conveyance that excluded depths described in the 
exhibit are being reserved. 
B. Warranting to Specified Working and Net Revenue Interests. 
If the conveyance grants all of the grantor’s right, title and interest, the 
grantee must make sure that the special warranty guarantees a specified 
quantum of interest in particular lands, leases, depths and/or wells 
described.  A warranty of title with respect to a conveyance of merely all or 
a specified portion of the grantor’s right, title and interest in a property is 
essentially worthless, because it is impossible to breach such a warranty.   
To avoid this result, the grantee should make sure that the warranty 
clause refers to the interests represented by the grantor in an exhibit to the 
conveyance.  Alternatively, the granting language in the conveyance can be 
bifurcated into two parts – one part conveying the specified represented 
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interests, and another conveying any remaining interest of the grantor in the 
more broadly defined property. 
C. Making the Conveyance “Subject To” Certain Agreements and 
Encumbrances. 
When granting a special warranty, the grantor should not only consider 
whether it has previously conveyed an interest in the property, such as a 
royalty or overriding royalty interest; it should be careful to clarify that the 
grantee is aware of and receiving the property subject to other arrangements 
affecting the property that could be considered encumbrances or otherwise 
affect the grantee’s working and net revenue interests, and thereby be 
grounds for a claim of breach of the special warranty.  For example, after 
closing of the transaction, a grantee might be in a position to successfully 
claim that an undisclosed agreement including but not limited to any of the 
following agreements encumbers that property in breach of the special 
warranty: joint operating agreements, easements or right of ways, farmout 
agreements, area of mutual interest agreements, gathering, transportation, 
production, sale or processing agreements, long term equipment leases, 
joint exploration or development agreements, gas balancing agreements, 
preferential rights, first refusal or drag along agreements, or pooling or unit 
agreements.87  To avoid such a result, the grantor should clarify that the 
special warranty does not guarantee against claims arising under such 
agreements, perhaps listing them in the conveyance as permitted 
encumbrances, or incorporating them as such by reference to a purchase 
and sale agreement. 
D. Specifying What is Warranted. 
The drafter should be careful to specify what is being warranted.  Is it 
more than the title that is being warranted?  For example, in Oklahoma the 
statutory implied warranty includes five covenants.  If the special warranty 
clause is drafted to be nothing more than limiting the enforcement of these 
covenants against claims by, through and under the grantor, then more than 
title is warranted.  If the grantor intends the special warranty to cover less 
than the five covenants, it needs to so specify.  Without specification, the 
                                                                                                                 
 87. For discussion of how these agreements might encumber the property, and the effect 
of including “subject to” language in the conveyance, see Milam Randolph Pharo and Sam 
Niebrugge, Industry Agreement Affecting Record Title, 52 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 2015. 
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scope of the warranty can be subject to interpretations that do not meet the 
grantor’s expectations.88 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Wagner vs. Cutler, 232 Mont. 322 (1988) (interpreting a Special Warranty Deed to 
include a warranty as to condition of the property, even though applicable statutory warranty 
implied no such covenant). 
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